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Ana Margarida Ferreira1,3 and Alberto Freitas1,3Abstract
Background: Audit Trails (AT) are fundamental to information security in order to guarantee access traceability but
can also be used to improve Health information System’s (HIS) quality namely to assess how they are used or
misused. This paper aims at analysing the existence and quality of AT, describing scenarios in hospitals and making
some recommendations to improve the quality of information.
Methods: The responsibles of HIS for eight Portuguese hospitals were contacted in order to arrange an interview
about the importance of AT and to collect audit trail data from their HIS. Five institutions agreed to participate in
this study; four of them accepted to be interviewed, and four sent AT data. The interviews were performed in 2011
and audit trail data sent in 2011 and 2012. Each AT was evaluated and compared in relation to data quality
standards, namely for completeness, comprehensibility, traceability among others. Only one of the AT had enough
information for us to apply a consistency evaluation by modelling user behaviour.
Results: The interviewees in these hospitals only knew a few AT (average of 1 AT per hospital in an estimate of 21
existing HIS), although they all recognize some advantages of analysing AT. Four hospitals sent a total of 7 AT – 2
from Radiology Information System (RIS), 2 from Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS), 3 from
Patient Records. Three of the AT were understandable and three of the AT were complete. The AT from the patient
records are better structured and more complete than the RIS/PACS.
Conclusions: Existing AT do not have enough quality to guarantee traceability or be used in HIS improvement. Its
quality reflects the importance given to them by the CIO of healthcare institutions. Existing standards (e.g. ASTM:
E2147, ISO/TS 18308:2004, ISO/IEC 27001:2006) are still not broadly used in Portugal.Background
The practice of medicine has been described as being dom-
inated by how well information is collected, processed,
retrieved, and communicated [1]. An important challenge
is to guarantee the good working conditions for health pro-
fessionals to access clinical data while Hospital Information
Systems (HIS) are still being developed [2]. Although great
advances have been made over the years, on-demand
access to clinical information is still inadequate in many
settings, contributing to duplication of effort, excess costs,
adverse events, and reduced efficiency [3]. Shapiro et al. [4]* Correspondence: ricardo.jc.correia@gmail.com
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumfound that, although doctors from emergency department
believe their patients would benefit from the use of longi-
tudinal records, they only try to obtain such data in 10% of
the cases. Furthermore, Hripcsak et al. [5] described access
rates to Clinical information System (WebCIS) in the
emergency department [5], indicating that data generated
before the current emergency visit are accessed often, but
by no means in a majority of times (only 5% to 20% of the
encounters), even when the user was notified of the avail-
ability of such data. Cruz-Correia et al. [6] have shown that
not many clinical reports are still used one year after cre-
ation, regardless of the context in which they were created,
although significant differences existed in reports created
during distinct hospital encounter types. Also, the usage of
patients’ past information (data from previous encounters)
varied according to the setting of healthcare and content.
This type of research is only possible when records withntral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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in a HIS, when and what operations were involved are
properly collected. These records are called Audit Trails
(AT) [7]. Although, AT are generally just intended to trace
user events when an incident occurs, they can also be used
to improve HIS. Some attention as already been given de-
fine the requirements of AT in healthcare, namely by RFC
3881, IHE-ATNA, DICOM. These standards are being
referenced in some of the most important projects today
(e.g. epSOS or “Meaningful use stage 2” proposed rule).
Aim
This paper aims to address the issues related to the ex-
istence and quality of AT regarding patient records, to
describe the Hospital’s scenario and to produce recom-
mendations. It comprises studies on:
 the opinions of Hospital Chief Information Officer
(CIO) regarding AT,
 the data elements to include in AT,
 quality of data dimensions to use in AT, and
 an analysis of the existing AT within Portuguese
Hospitals.
State of art
The most common AT function is the access management
[8]. Nonetheless, other relevant functions exist such as the
monitoring of employee behaviour and computer / infor-
mation system failures. An AT can be used and analysed
with many different purposes, although with a higher im-
pact when used as evidence in healthcare practices law-
suits, or in the internal validation of new practices, like the
introduction of a new IS. The best way to assess the ac-
countability in lawsuits would be to backtrack the records
to their state at the point of care; thus, a trail is mandatory
[9]. On the clinical point of view, relevance has been given
to the importance of AT, for example, in the validation of
clinical decision support systems in paediatric critical care
[10] or in the integration of multi-centric clinical trial data
management [11].
Creating an AT implies the implementation of several
audit controls [8], possibly integrated among multiple IS
(e.g. Radiology Information System (RIS), Electronic
Health Record (EHR) and Picture Archiving and Com-
munication System (PACS)). RIS are one of the groups
of systems where this integration has been better audited
[12]. The resulting audit files, possibly distributed in the
network, are what in computer science is commonly
called “log files” of an IS. However, log files are most of
the times lightly defined by software companies having
only debugging purposes. The notion of AT extends that
of a log file, in the sense that it can also be used to
monitor the development of electronic health records,
the import and export of protected health informationfrom and to external entities, the modification, viewing
and deletion of information, making it possible to rely on
the integrity of the records in health information ex-
changes and the data fed into personal health records [8].
Different institutions as EuroRec [13], the ISO/HL7 21731
(RIM) [14] standard, and IHE [15] have approached this
issue. Information Technology (IT) governance practices
(e.g., IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL), which recommends
on the use of AT for proper service level management) are
being introduced in many Hospitals to cope with increas-
ing levels of information quality and safety requirements.
But the standard maturity levels of hospital IT departments
is still not enough to reach the level of frequent use of
AT [16].
In 2007, the Portuguese Government approved the
Law 46/2007 that regulates the administrative docu-
ments access and reutilization. This law states that the
patient is the owner of his/her health information and
he/she has the right to request access to his/her medical
information and to access it without any intermediary
[17]. Unfortunately, there is no Portuguese law or regu-
lation enforcing health care institutions to have
complete and secure audit trails in their own institutions
and the initiatives such as HIPAA, HITECH or EuroRec
are still not considered when defining the security re-
quirements for new Healthcare Information Systems.
The application of data mining and machine learning
techniques to medical knowledge discovery tasks is now a
growing research area. These techniques vary widely and
are based on data-driven conceptualizations, model-based
definitions or are a combination of data-based knowledge
with human-expert knowledge [18]. Another important
technique in this area is process mining. It aims at deriving
process models from observed user behaviour [19], by
extracting knowledge from the event logs recorded in the
IS [20]. The AT can be used to uncover process, control,
data, organizational, and social structures [21-23]. AT have
some important interdependencies [24], namely with Policy
(who is authorized, to access what), Operational Assurance,
Identification and Authentication (user accountability),
Logical Access Control (identify breakdowns, audit use of
resources), Contingency Planning (reconstruction of the
state of the system), Incident Response (to understand the
magnitude of the incident), and Cryptography (to alert for
modification of the audit trail).
Methods
This section presents the methods used in the interview,
and in the analysis of the AT.
Participants in the interview and collection of AT
A convenience sample of CIOs was selected with the aim
to find out about the AT usage in their institutions. Due to
the sensitive nature of this information, each institution
Cruz-Correia et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2013, 13:84 Page 3 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/13/84involved was made anonymous. The institutions were
identified as Hospitals A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H, 4 District
(DH) and 4 Central Hospitals, as shown in Table 1.
Three of them refused to participate in the study
(F, G and H). In the other 5 institutions it was not pos-
sible to perform interviews and collect AT in all hospi-
tals. In particular, we could not collect AT in Hospital
C because the provider of the IS was an external com-
pany and did not allow the collection. We asked for
samples of the existing AT, and then for the AT in the
original format if they were flat files or tabular format
exports (e.g. CSV) if they were in databases. The only
modification we asked for was the anonimization re-
garding patients and system users.
Interviews to hospital CIOs
Aiming to describe the current scenario in Portuguese
Hospitals, interviews were performed to representatives of
IT departments (CIOs). These representatives were the dir-
ector of the department (n = 4) or someone that was
directly responsible to maintain the HIS (n = 1). These
semi-structured interviews were performed by telephone
during January 2011, and apart from other interesting
topics that could emerge during the interview, at least the
following questions were raised in the following order:
1. What is the number of IS that have AT?
2. What is the frequency that someone asks to use
this data?
3. What were the main reasons to access AT?
4. What are the potential main benefits to record
these AT?
5. What are the main problems to record these AT?
6. Have you direct access to them, or need to ask it
from the software providers?”
Data elements important for the completeness of AT and
quality of data dimensions applicable to AT
Based on the work of Halanka et al. described in [25], to
be a quality AT it should have at least the following data
elements: 1) Time; 2) Date; 3) Information Accessed and
4) User ID. Other studies [25-27] and a ASTM standard
specification [28] also describe as being important to
include other elements like 1) User Position/Role; 2)
Patient Location (e.g. Ward); 3) Actualization Reason; 4)
Chart Access Reason; 5) Document Code; 6) OrdersTable 1 CIOs of institutions interviewed and AT collected
A B C D E F G H
(DH) (DH) (CH) (DH) (CH) (DH) (CH) (CH)
Interview ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Refused to answer
AT Collection ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
DH: –District Hospital, CH: –Central Hospital.Entered; 7) Service/Department and 8) User’s Place of
Work (e.g. Ward). According to the CCHIT (Certification
Commission for Healthcare Information Technology) the
following elements are also mandatory:1) date and time
of the event, 2) the component of the information system
(e.g., software component, hardware component) where
the event occurred, 3) type of event (including: data de-
scription and patient identifier when relevant), 4) subject
identity (e.g. user identity); and 5) the outcome (success or
failure) of the event. Table 2 presents the data elements
considered important by each of these studies, compares
them with the ones needed for our own process-mining
studies [29], and presents an overall importance rate based
on the frequency each element is referred.
The ISO 25012 [30] was also used to define the di-
mensions of quality of data applicable to AT.Processing the collected AT
It was necessary to process/analyse the collected AT.
For this, some computer applications were created: 1)
one of these applications removed data not relevant to
our study (e.g. numeric values that had no meaning
for us), 2) another application created a new field
(COMPUTER_SESSION) when it is not present (gener-
ated by using other fields like USER, START_DATE and
END_DATE), 3) and an application for the anonymization
of user and patient identification (see Figure 1).
In Figure 1, the first row (Institution) represents the
4 hospitals from which AT data were collected; the sec-
ond row (Department) represents the department that
contains the application from which the AT were
extracted; the third row (Type of Application) repre-
sents the type of application in each department from
which AT were extracted; the fourth row (Conversion
Application) represents the computer applications created
to 1) remove data not relevant to our study, 2) insert the
session field and 3) anonymize user and patient identifica-
tion; the fifth row (Database) represents the database
where every information collected from hospitals was
saved; the sixth row (Analysis) represents the software
used to analyse data [31].
The major difficulties encountered during this stage
were:
 Data received from different institutions and
different type/specialties were not always
comparable (e.g. institution B sent information
about Patient Record and institution E sent
information about Radiology).
 Missing data (e.g. computer_ip, session start_date,
session end_date).
 The format used in some AT is very confusing: no
characters to separate values, some events had
















User ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ★★
(User Credentials)
Start_date ✓ ✓ ★
(Session start date)
End_date ✓ ✓ ★
(Session end date)
Computer_ip ✓ ✓ ★
(computer IP)
User position/Role ✓ ○
Event
Date/Hour ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ★★
(Event date)




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ★★
(Information accessed)
Patient Location (Ward) ✓ ✓ ★
Actualization Reason/ Reason for Update ✓ ✓ ★
Chart Access Reason ✓ ○
Document Code ✓ ○
Document Type ✓ ○
Event_Description ✓ ✓ ○
(Event description)




User’s Place of Work (Ward) ✓ ○
Source of Access ✓ ○
Outcome indicator ✓ ○
Event_Id ✓ ○
Participants_Object_Id ✓ ○
LEGEND: ✓ – mandatory in study/report of each column; ★★ – essential; ★– important; ○ optional.
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several files due to balanced servers.Assessing the quality of AT
The quality of existing AT in the Portuguese Hospitals
was assessed using (a) the previously defined most im-
portant data elements to include in an AT (see section
“Data elements important for the completeness of
AT”), and (b) the quality dimensions applicable to AT.Ethical approval
The Health Ethical Commission of the HSJ approved
this study (Comissão de Ética de Saúde do HSJ), having
the reference number 45/2010.
Results
Opinions of hospital CIOs regarding AT
The main questions and answers obtained from the in-
terviewees are presented in Table 3. These interviewees
were only certain of one IS allowing AT in each of their
Figure 1 AT collected and treated. RIS: Radiology Information System; PACS: Picture Archiving and Communication System; VEPR: Virtual
Electronic Patient Record; EPR: Electronic Patient Record.
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IS within these hospitals [32]). At least one more IS with
AT is known by the authors to exist in 4 of the 5 hospi-
tals, although the representatives did not knew about
them. In only one of these hospitals the AT feature was
mentioned in the requirements for the development and
implementation of new IS. In one of the hospitals there
was even a Laboratory Information System (LIS) that al-
though it had the ability to maintain AT, the IT depart-
ment staff decided to disabled it.
Regarding the frequency of access to the AT, all repre-
sentatives mentioned that they accessed or were askedTable 3 Questions made to IT department representatives of
Question Answers
What is the number of IS that have AT? • One IS per institution. A
(Picture Archiving and
although with the abil
What is the frequency that someone asks
to use this data?
• All representatives sai
few people knew tha
What were the reasons to access AT? • Only one representati
doctors have seen the
What are the potential main benefits
to record these AT?
• It allows the institutio
component and calcu
• It helps to do health
• It may legally support
• It may dissuade inapp
What are the main problems to record those AT? • Too much data to ma
• Makes the systems slo
Have you direct access to them,
or need to ask the SW providers?
• Direct access, by acceto access the AT very rarely or never. They did not feel
it was their duty to control who was accessing patient
data. It was also mentioned that very few people outside
the IT departments knew it was even possible to collect
this data, and that if other people knew maybe they
would ask for it.
Concerning the reasons to access AT, one representa-
tive said that he, together with the responsible of the
radiology department used them to audit which doctors
were discharging patients from the Emergency Room
without viewing the reports. The other three representa-
tives did not remember of ever using them.hospitals about AT in their IS
ctual answers were: LIS (Laboratory Information System) and PACS
Communication System) (twice). There are computer applications that,
ity to store AT viewing, have this functionality disabled (e.g. Pathology Lab IS)
d very rarely or none. One representative argued that very
t it was even possible to have this information
ve answered that the AT were used (very rarely) to audit if
radiology reports in ER before making the patient discharge




ropriate user access to patient data
intain (one answer)
wer (one answer)
ssing the database tables (all answered the same)
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One representative intended to use AT to maintain or to
remove IS implemented functionalities based on the
amount of usage they had. Another mentioned that
further health service research could be performed (e.g.
workflows) based in these AT. Checking what patient
data was available and was seen by health professionals
at the time of clinical decisions for legal or ethical
reasons was also stated. Finally, it was mentioned that
the announcement of AT could dissuade inappropriate
access to patient data.
The two referred problems associated with AT were the
amount of disk space they took, and the fact that they
would make the IS work slower. Regarding the access to
the AT data, all representatives said they would need to ac-
cess directly the IS database tables if they wanted to audit
the access of a particular user to a piece of patient data.
Data elements important for the completeness of AT
Three groups of importance were created according to
the frequency of references to specific data elements (see
column overall importance in Table 2):
– Essential. These were the data elements that were
referenced more than 4 times (see Table 2). These
were considered mandatory for a complete AT.
– “User”, “Event Date/Hour”, “Patient ID”, and “Report
ID/Document ID/Information Accessed”.
– Important. These were the data elements that had 2
or 3 references.
– “Start Date”, “End Date”, “Computer IP number”,
“Patient Location”, “Reason for Update” and “Event
Description”.
– Optional. All the other fields were considered
optional.
– “User position/Role”, “Chart Access Reason”,
“Document Code”, “Document Type”, “Orders
Entered”, “Service/Department”, “Session ID”, “User’s
Place of Work”, “Source of Access”, “Outcome of
event”, “Participants ID”, “Event ID”.
Quality of data dimensions applicable to AT
Apart from the completeness of AT, other dimensions
were also considered.
There are several general approaches to classify data
quality problems (e.g. dirty data), with different defini-
tions and interpretations. Among them we may find
comprehensive enumerations of data quality problems
[33-35], a definition of taxonomy for data quality anom-
alies in a database perspective [36], and a taxonomy
focused on time-oriented data quality problems [37]. Re-
search on data quality identified many different data de-
sirable attributes (dimensions), but there is not a total
agreement on their definitions. For instance, Weiskopfand Weng [38] the literature and identified five common
dimensions (completeness, correctness, concordance,
plausibility, and currency) for the assessment of data
quality in the context of electronic health record data re-
use for research, and found a great variability and over-
lap in the terms used to describe each dimension. We
feel that the option for the generic data quality model
proposed by the ISO 25012 [30] standard is important
to guarantee a domain independent perspective.
The ISO 25012 is a standard composed of 15 generic
quality dimensions. Although this standard addresses data
quality in software engineering, we believe that it could
also be applied to AT data with a few adaptations. These
adaptations consisted in removing dimensions that we felt
that were part of AT intrinsic definition (Currentness) or
that were not applicable (Confidentiality, Efficiency and
Portability).
These dimensions need to be instantiated into more
practical factors to be assessed. These factors were defined
based on our previous experience and on quality issues
found in the collected AT. Table 4 presents the dimensions
addressed by ISO 25012 (e.g. “1. Completeness”, “2.
Consistency”), and the practical factors we analysed in each
of these dimensions (e.g. “1.1 Percentage of important
fields to AT”, “2.1 Actions performed after logout”).
The process mining researchers are also starting to give
special attention to the quality of AT. In Mans et al. and
Bose et al., several real-life event logs (some related to
healthcare) are analysed to illustrate the existence of
process and event log problems/issues [39,40]. The authors
also expect encourage systematic logging approaches,
repair techniques and analysis techniques.AT collected and their quality
Every institution was contacted by phone and emailed in
the beginning of 2011. In Hospital B, AT were collected
from the Electronic Patient Record (EPR); in Hospital C
they were collected from the use at Radiology data in an
EPR; in Hospital D they were collected from Radiology
Information System (RIS) and Picture Archiving and
Communication System (PACS), and Patient Record
from Virtual Electronic Patient Record (VEPR); and in
Hospital E they were collected from RIS and PACS.
Completeness
Complete information is sufficient in depth, breadth,
and scope to be used as an audit trail.
Only 3 out of the 7 collected AT included the 4 essen-
tial fields in their structure (see Table 4). The AT pro-
vided had from 13 to 69 data fields (26 in average).
Some AT had many missing values in these data fields.
None of the AT were satisfactory, and some were very
poor (e.g. PACS in Hospital D).
Table 4 Results of ISO 25012 standard analysis
Dimension Institutions
D C B E
RIS PACS VEPR EPR EPR PACS RIS
1 Completeness
1.1 Percentage of existing essential fields 100% 50% 100% 100% 50% 75% 50%
1.2 Completeness (i.e. without missing values) of sent data 66% 20% 40% 96% 34% 32% 31%
2 Consistency
2.1 Percentage of actions after logout — — 1.6% — — — —
2.2 Percentage of fields filled differently in similar situations NA NA 4.34% NA NA 14.2% NA
3 Comprehensibility
3.1 Is the information structured? NO NO YES YES YES NO NO
3.2 Number of fields with intuitive name /Number of fields 46% 46% 83% 83% 100% 64% 46%
4 Traceability
4.1 Is there a special functionality to know who accessed logs? NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
5 Accessibility
5.1 There is a restricted access to logs with user and password? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
5.2 Are logs easy to query? NO NO YES YES YES NO NO
6 Credibility
6.1 Duration of Sessions (average) — — 10 m1 — — — —
6.2 Is there a user profile? — — YES — YES — —
7 Accuracy
7.1 Is the DATE format coherent? YES YES YES NO YES — YES
7.2 Can we distinguish the time zone? (Summer/Winter) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
8 Precision
8.2 Are the seconds of the actions recorded? YES YES YES SOMETIMES YES YES YES
8.3 Are the milliseconds of the actions recorded? NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
9 Recoverability
9.1 Are there backups? — — YES — — — —
1 – When the timeout happens; NA: Not applicable, – Unknown.
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Consistent information is free from contradiction and
coherent with other information.
The dimension consistency was analysed by exploring
actions in applications that we knew did not make sense
regarding the natural flow of application usage, and situ-
ations that were similar although recorded with different
descriptions.
Unfortunately in only one AT (from VEPR of Institution
D), was there enough information (number of cases and
variables) for us to analyse. This analysis was performed
by: (1) modelling user behaviour by designing graphs that
illustrate the sequence of actions performed by users and
(2) finding strange patterns (e.g. people doing the same ac-
tion repeatedly in very small intervals of time, or just
searching for patients without actually seeing any informa-
tion about them or performing actions without a login). In
the analysed AT a significant number of inconsistent casesoccurred (in 1.6% of all sessions logouts there is a
performed action after the logout).
In two systems of the same Institution E there were se-
mantic issues related to recording the same actions with
different descriptions (4.34% in VEPR and 14.2% PACS).
These cases are probably due to using the same log files
for updated software versions that describe similar actions
with different names (e.g. logout and sign-out).”
Comprehensibility
Comprehensible information has attributes that enable it
to be read and interpreted, are expressed in appropriate
languages, symbols and units.
The dimension comprehensibility was sub-divided in
having the AT structured and having the different fields
named in an intuitive way. Only 3 of the 7 received AT
have a proper structure (the other 4 were not in a tabu-
lar format and seemed to be mainly debug logs). And, in
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the contents, making it very difficult to understand their
meaning.
Traceability
Tracable information includes owner or author of the
information, and any changes made to the information
can be checked.
Regarding traceability of accesses to the AT, none of
the solutions had a special functionality to prevent and
record accesses to the AT. This had to be performed
based on the Operating System log files of the servers
holding the AT.
Accessibility
Acessible information is able to be processed and read.
Accessibility was divided into controlling the access to
the AT and the easiness to process the data in them. As
stated in traceability the access was controlled by Operat-
ing Systems’ authentication control in PACS and RIS and
by Database authentication control in the EPR or VEPR.
Credibility
Credible information is reputable, unbiased / objective,
and trustable / believable.
This item aims to evaluate if one can trust the user’s
identification associated with each action that is recorded
in the AT. This aim was sub-divided into (1) checking if
the duration of user sessions was too long (which indicates
that there was no session timeouts and therefore session
was shared among users) and (2) the inexistence of user
profiles in the AT. Only one system (VEPR) included infor-
mation regarding session timeout, and in only two of other
systems there was a user role in the AT.
Accuracy
Accurate information has a correct representation of the
true value of the intended attributes of a concept.
Regarding accuracy, special attention was given to date
information, namely the coherence of date information
throughout the AT and the distinction of time zones and
Summer/Winter time. Regarding the coherence, in one
of the AT dates with different formats were found, and
none of the formats included time zones (not so import-
ant) or Summer/Winter time (much more important).
Precision
Precise information provides attributes that are exact or
enough discrimination.
Regarding precision, special attention was given to
dates. Only one system recorded the milliseconds of ac-
tions (EPR at B), another system did not record the sec-
onds in all the events (EPR at C), and all the others
recorded the seconds but not the milliseconds.Availability
Available information can be retrieved by authorized
users and/or applications.
The availability dimension was not evaluated, as these
AT were the ones made available to us by the Hospitals.
Nevertheless, it is important to state that Hospitals had
difficulties to collect some of these AT which were only
solved with the intervention of the software suppliers.
Recoverability
Recoverability is related to maintaining and preserving a
specified level of operations and quality, even in the
event of failure.
Regarding recoverability, in only one of the Hospitals
it was possible for us to confirm the existence of
backups regarding their AT.
Discussion
Global
Although there is some awareness for the need to have
quality in AT, the existing ones are very poor and not
able to provide suitable traceability or help analyse HIS
usage.
Most of the concerns found are not related to key
technical difficulties, but probably more related to poor
understanding of what should be present on an AT and
not giving enough importance to record the actions of
users in HIS. In our opinion, the source of this problem
is associated with the fact that customers (health institu-
tions) do not request software capable of delivering
proper AT from their software providers.
Opinions of Hospital CIOs regarding AT
It was obvious, from the interviews that there was little
concern in confirming if AT existed, were being maintained
and properly secured. Also, little concern in including this
feature as requirements for new IS or upgrades.
Data elements to include in AT
We argue that the data elements qualified as essential
should be made mandatory for AT in any IS acquired. In
particular, the correct identification of patient and user
is crucial. On the other hand, the identification of the re-
ports / documents is more difficult, as no document no-
menclature has widespread use. The RFC 3881 [41] or
IHE-ATNA provides a good starting point and has been
used in several projects and regulation as epSOS or
more recently “Meaningful Use Stage 2 Proposed Rule”.
One of the most important pieces of AT is the time
when each action is performed. For it to be comprehen-
sible, the values must have sufficient detail (seconds or
milliseconds) and be unambiguous. The difficult part to
guarantee is unambiguity, due to differences in storing
time formats, to un-synchronization of clocks and to
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recommend dates to be stored as complete dates [42]
and that all servers have their clocks synchronized with
each other using known standards [43] and with an offi-
cial time server.
To improve the session information, it can be useful
that, besides username, start and end session date, the
terminal IP number used to access information and how
was the session terminated (e.g. user, timeout or other)
is also stored. The IP number can be used to more ef-
fectively re-create scenarios of information access, and
to detect irregular behaviours as having the same users
logged in two different terminals at the same time. The
method used to terminate the session can be used to
audit different user habits about letting the session
opened for other users to use the IS.
Apart from session start and end, the AT should also rec-
ord patient searches, data changes and the visualization of
patient data. Although the recording of data insert and up-
dates is more common, recording patient searches and
visualization of patient data can help attain some of the
most important potentialities of the AT, namely for health
service research and to legally support medical decisions.
Quality of data dimensions to use in AT
Another requirement, that is seldom observed, is that
the simple access to the AT, including the audit control
functions and the audit files, should always be controlled
to ensure the integrity of the records. The implications
of security in AT are vast and can be harmful.
Health information managers must confirm that the
auditing functions are turned on and fully functional. In
fact, health information managers would be quite sur-
prised to find that AT systems are not active or their
resulting audit files are kept only for a rather small
period of time.
Analysis of the existing AT in Portuguese hospitals
The AT was analysed according to the standard ISO
25012. To improve the quality of logs, we suggest 1) the
existence of a well-defined structure for readability; 2) that
every field is completed and 3) that the fields always use
the same format. Not using a standard to record audit
trails represents a major drawback when analysing data
and therefore makes it very difficult to use AT to improve
HIS. The use of ISO 25012, ISO/TS 18308:2004, ISO/IEC
27001:2006, XES Standard [44] and IHE-ATNA should
be used to define requirements. We also recommend
performing a periodical audit access to all data of a ran-
dom sample of patients.
The analysed audit trails were very poor regarding com-
pleteness. Many essential or important data elements were
missing making the interpretation of what the users actu-
ally did very hard. This issue also made the consistencydimension difficult to analyse in most of the AT. Neverthe-
less, in the only one with enough data, actions inconsistent
with the proper use of an HIS were found.
The traceability of access to the AT was completely miss-
ing in the studied cases and the accessibility was controlled
by the Operating System or DBMS. The ISO/TS
18308:2004 and ISO/IEC 27001:2006 standards and the
IHE-ATNA regulation or similar regarding controlling ac-
cess to the AT should be seriously considered if the AT is
to be used in a legal environment, namely as a proof that
someone has accessed or not a particular patient record.
Regarding credibility, not all of the important events
(e.g. session logout) are recorded in the AT.
Regarding accuracy and precision the main issues are
related to date and time. The formats found were incon-
sistent and not with enough precision. No AT used the
ISO 8601 format. This situation is also a major drawback
to the safe use of this data.
Finally, we also advocate the existence of an auditing
visualization tool that could easily present 1) all actions
performed by an user, 2) all actions performed on the
record of a patient, and 3) the navigation flows of groups
of users by presenting them on graphs and using graph
theory to analyse them.
Conclusions
Although there is some awareness for the need to have
quality in audit trails, the existing AT are very poor and
not able to provide proper traceability or help analyse
Health Information Systems usage. Regarding the AT
analysed, the lack of internal structure, data quality and
precision limits it’s useful for legal issues and health infor-
mation systems improvement. Existing standards (e.g.
ASTM: E2147, ISO/TS 18308:2004, ISO/IEC 27001:2006)
are still not broadly used in Portugal.
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